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Reforming	Whitehall:	bluff,	bluster,	brilliance	and
brains
Geoff	Mulgan	assesses	Dominic	Cummings’	proposals	for	reforming	government	and	argues	that,	while	bringing
new	people	and	ideas	into	Number	10	can	be	welcome,	there	are	several	pitfalls,	not	least	in	failing	to	learn	from
past	attempts	at	reform.
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Over	the	last	few	months	there	has	been	a	frenzy	of	interest	in	the	plans	of	Dominic	Cummings,	and	his	boss	Boris
Johnson,	to	reshape	the	British	state.	There’s	been	talk	of	bringing	in	brilliant	weirdos;	radically	reorganising
Whitehall;	and	ditching	deadbeat	civil	servants.	Last	year	I	wrote	a	piece	lamenting	that	the	new	generation	of
populist	political	leaders	seemed	to	have	no	ideas	about	what	kind	of	government	they	wanted	(unlike	the
Thatcherites,	Blairites	and	others).	So	I’ve	been	pleasantly	surprised	to	see	attention	turning	not	just	to	what
government	does	but	how	it	does	things.	I’d	been	waiting	to	see	a	bit	more	of	the	substance	before	commenting,
but	since	very	little	has	yet	appeared	I	thought	I	might	as	well	offer	my	take.
Nearly	twenty	years	ago	I	was	closely	involved	in	similar	attempts	to	bring	in	new	ideas	and	energy	to	Whitehall.	I
helped	set	up	the	Social	Exclusion	Unit,	and	then	ran	the	Performance	and	Innovation	Unit	and	the	Strategy	Unit	for
four	years.	The	SU	at	its	peak	had	some	150	people,	half	from	outside	government,	brought	in	to	design	smarter
policies	on	everything	from	drugs	to	climate	change,	rough	sleeping	to	local	government	finance.	We	deliberately
aimed	to	bring	in	new	skills	(from	modelling	to	futures)	and	new	mindsets,	as	well	as	frontline	experience,	and	since
then	I	have	worked	with	many	of	the	world’s	most	effective	governments,	from	Singapore	and	Finland	to	Estonia
and	China.	All	grapple	with	the	challenge	of	how	to	turn	government	–	which	is	naturally	cautious	and	conservative
–	into	an	effective	force	for	change	(if	you’re	interested,	my	many	writings	on	government	covering	everything	from
structures	to	data,	strategy	to	people,	can	be	found	here).
This	experience	makes	me	less	hostile	than	most	to	Cummings’	call	for	weirdos	and	misfits.	Government	needs	a
constant	influx	of	heretics	to	challenge	the	tendencies	to	cynical	and	world-weary	fatalism	that	can	overcome	any
bureaucracy.	Cummings	has	many	parallels	with	Steve	Hilton	in	the	first	Cameron	years,	who	was	convinced	he
could	reshape	the	system,	and	was	hated	by	civil	servants.	He	did	bring	in	new	ideas	and	energy	for	a	time,	before
he	flounced	off	to	become	a	TV	host	(unfortunately	as	a	former	advertising	man	he	lacked	interest	in	how	the
system	actually	worked,	and	so	had	much	less	impact	than	he	might	have).
I’m	also	favourable	to	many	of	the	ideas	Cummings	has	floated,	not	least	because	all	of	them	were	used	or
explored	in	the	past	–	from	red	teams	to	the	use	of	outsiders,	reducing	numbers	of	ministers	to	deconstructing	civil
service	roles	(my	main	disappointment	so	far	is	that	there	don’t	seem	to	be	any	new	ideas).
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I	also	recognise	that	you	need	a	certain	arrogance	to	change	any	system,	which	is	also	why	I’m	not	surprised	by
the	bluster	and	bravado.	So	what	can	we	conclude	so	far?	How	much	of	what	we	are	seeing	is	brilliance	and
brains,	and	how	much	is	the	bluff	and	bluster	of	two	Oxbridge	classicists?
Let’s	start	with	the	diagnosis.	Doing	a	critique	of	British	government	isn’t	hard.	Our	civil	service	may	pride	itself	on
being	a	Rolls	Royce,	but	like	its	counterparts	it	has	struggled	to	adapt	to	new	times	and	new	roles.	This	is	why	very
similar	critiques	have	been	made	for	over	half	a	century	bemoaning	poor	memory,	the	lack	of	key	skills	(such	as
procurement	or	IT),	overly	rapid	movement	from	job	to	job	and	prioritising	good	prose	over	practical	implementation
skills.	Here	are	problems	which	definitely	still	need	fixing.	The	same	is	true	of	the	longstanding	question	of	how	to
create	a	more	coherent	centre	of	government	(which	I’ve	written	on	before),	and	a	less	dominant	Treasury.	There
are	good	reasons	why	no	other	country	has	adopted	the	UK	model.
But	there	are	four	missing	parts	of	the	Cummings	diagnosis	and	prescription.	Whether	these	can	be	dealt	with	will
determine	whether	this	is	just	another	flourish	of	a	brainy,	but	not	altogether	serious,	individual	or	something	more
significant.
The	first	is	politics.	A	high	proportion	of	the	errors	of	government	reflect	the	flaws	of	politics	and	party	politics,	not
the	government	machine.	These	are	just	a	few	of	them:	there	are	far	too	many	ministers	with	therefore	far	too	many
half-baked	initiatives	designed	to	get	a	promotion;	there	is	zero	training	for	politicians	(this	is	about	the	only	job
where	it’s	assumed	you	can	do	it	on	day	one);	and	the	political/media	nexus	puts	little	value	on	dull	competence
and	implementation	over	long	periods	of	time.	The	average	tenure	of	many	ministerial	roles	is	barely	a	year	now.
Since	it	takes	a	year	for	even	a	smart	minister	to	learn	how	to	do	the	job,	the	result	is	that	most	ministers,	most	of
the	time,	are	incompetent.	That’s	bad	enough	on	its	own.	But	the	new	government’s	predilection	for	briefing	the
media	that	ministers	could	be	sacked	at	any	moment	and	its	use	of	the	recent	reshuffle	to	signal	that	loyalty	and
compliance	matter	more	than	effectiveness,	makes	it	all	the	more	likely	that	politicians	could	undermine	good
government	rather	than	enhancing	it.
The	second	is	systems.	It’s	good	to	see	someone	who	has	engaged	with	at	least	some	of	the	literature	on
complexity	and	systems	even	if	it’s	hard	to	tell	how	much	has	been	digested.	But	the	big	lesson	of	all	serious
thinking	about	systems	is	that	without	buy-in	from	the	bottom	the	top-down	changes	rarely	stick,	even	in	states	with
authoritarian	powers	far	beyond	what	UK	ministers	could	dream	of.	That	is	true	within	Whitehall	(which	is	why	the
Strategy	Unit	worked	hard	to	get	its	projects	commissioned	by	ministers	and	not	just	No	10).	And	it	is	even	more
true	of	public	services.	If	there	is	no	strategy	for	engaging	hearts	and	minds	the	programme	is	almost	certain	to	fail.
The	third	is	practicality.	One	of	the	big	vices	of	Westminster	and	Whitehall	is	their	valuing	of	words	over	deeds.
Johnson	is	a	classic,	perhaps	extreme	case,	whose	entire	career	has	rested	on	facility	with	words	not	things	(one
reason	why	no-one	should	hold	their	breath	waiting	for	a	bridge	to	be	built	between	Scotland	and	northern	Ireland).
This	was	also	the	flaw	of	the	new	public	management	theories	that	so	animated	Conservatives	a	generation	ago:
they	argued	then	for	separating	out	a	policy	elite	from	the	lower	status	cadres	who	would	actually	do	the
implementation.	Yet	that	is	often	a	recipe	for	bad	policy,	devoid	of	any	sense	of	on	the	ground	reality.	No	plans
survive	their	first	encounter	with	reality.	The	biggest	risk	of	the	Cummings	approach	is	that	it	may	be	just	yet
another	example	of	the	‘clever	chaps’	theory	of	change:	the	belief	that	a	small	cadre	of	super	smart	people	at	the
top	can	change	the	world.	In	his	writings	there	is	very	little	mention	of	including	people	with	practical	experience	of
big	projects,	running	schools,	policing,	perhaps	an	echo	of	how	little	experience	he	himself	has	of	actually	running
anything.	All	of	my	experience	confirms	that	policy	cannot	be	separated	from	implementation,	and	no	amount	of
cleverness	can	make	up	for	a	lack	of	feel	for	how	things	really	work.
Finally,	the	biggest	flaw	that	besets	governments	is	their	failure	to	learn.	The	best	ones	invest	heavily	in	learning
from	their	failures	and	their	successes,	and	one	key	argument	for	a	permanent	civil	service	is	that	it	organises	a
collective	memory.	Yet	ours	is	surprisingly	bad	at	managing	its	memory,	constantly	reinvents	wheels	or	forgets	what
worked	and	why	(the	subject	of	this	report	I	commissioned	in	2018	which	addressed	how	new	data	tools	could	be
used	to	help	government	remember,	a	topic	also	addressed	a	few	years	ago	by	Cummings	himself	with	rather	more
traditional	comments	on	government’s	use	of	libraries).	This	may	be	the	final	irony	of	the	still	amorphous	plans	for
reform.	There	is	no	mention	of	the	past.	No	mention	of	the	many	attempts	in	the	past	to	inject	new	ideas,	cognitive
diversity	and	competence	into	the	system.	This	failure	to	learn	is	what	makes	institutions	full	of	clever	people	so
capable	of	collective	stupidity.
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Other	fields	are	wiser.	If	a	business	start-up	came	with	a	pitch	but	couldn’t	answer	what	they	had	learned	from
previous	similar	ventures,	or	current	ones	in	the	rest	of	the	world,	they’d	be	unlikely	to	get	any	investment.	Similarly
in	the	natural	sciences	it’s	taken	for	granted	that	you	first	have	to	understand	the	state	of	any	field	before	you	try	to
advance	it.	Yet	for	politics	and	government	these	rules	don’t	seem	to	apply.	Bluff	and	bluster	can	paper	over	the
cracks	and	too	much	of	the	media	who	cover	government	have	so	little	knowledge	of	history,	let	alone	of	the	rest	of
the	world,	that	bluffers	can	get	away	with	murder.
A	government	with	a	big	majority	and	an	appetite	for	reform	has	a	good	opportunity	to	reshape	a	state	better	suited
to	the	big	tasks	of	the	next	decades,	from	cutting	carbon	to	reducing	inequality.	Although	the	UK’s	civil	service	is	full
of	clever	people,	there	is	lots	that	could	be	improved.	But	for	now	it	remains	unclear	whether	we’ll	instead	get
another	burst	of	sound	and	fury	that	in	the	end	signifies	nothing.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	Democratic	Audit.	It	was	first	published	on	Geoff
Mulgan’s	own	blog	and	is	republished	with	permission.
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